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On July 14, 2015, after two years of negotiations, the 
United States, the other permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran announced 
they had reached agreement on a Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program. On July 20 the Security Council endorsed the 
agreement unanimously.  
 
Under terms agreed between the U.S. Congress and 
the White House, Congress has until September 17th to 
disapprove the JCPOA if it wants to prevent President 
Obama from suspending U.S. nuclear sanctions after 
Iran fulfills its nuclear commitments. Thus an intense 
debate is underway.  
 
Advocates on both sides have been making their 
appeals to the American public at a volume, and with a 
forcefulness, seen in foreign policy issues only a few 
times a decade. After the initial rollout of the 
agreement—a phase in which the White House 
essentially held the floor—critics of the agreement 
have been widely heard, both in and out of Congress. 
Media polls have been sporadic and inconsistent.  In 
polls that offer respondents the opportunity to say that 
they do not have enough information to say, 
approximately half take it.  In this case, the minority 
opposing the deal tends to outweigh those favoring it.  
In some polls that give respondents minimal 
information about the basic outlines of the deal, 
majorities have approved of it.  Apparently Americans 
have low levels of information and their responses are 
affected by minimal inputs.  
 
Citizen Cabinet surveys are not meant to simply be 
another poll.  Rather the goal is to find out what a 
representative panel of registered voters recommends 
when they are given a briefing and hear arguments for 
and against the key options.  The process they go 
through is called a ‘policymaking simulation,’ in that 
the goal is to put the respondent into the shoes of a 
policymaker.  The content of the simulation is vetted 
with Congressional staffers and other experts to assure 
accuracy and balance.  
 
Earlier Citizen Cabinet surveys on the Iran deal focused 
on the central debate at the time as to whether the US  
 
should make a deal based on allowing Iran limited 
uranium enrichment with intrusive inspections or if it 
should seek to ramp up economic sanctions in an effort 
to get Iran to give up its enrichment program entirely.  
Arguments for both options were found convincing but 
in the end, in February, 61% in a national Citizen 
Cabinet recommended in favor of making the deal.  In 
June Citizen Cabinet surveys in three states (Oklahoma, 
Maryland, and Virginia) went through the same process 
but with more detail about the draft agreement.  In all 
states seven in ten recommended the deal over 
ramping up sanctions.   
 
In the current Citizen Cabinet survey the simulation 
focused much more deeply on the terms of the deal, 
especially the terms that have been highly criticized by 
Members of Congress.  Panelists were first briefed on 
the origins of the international dispute over Iran’s 
nuclear program and the main issues during the 
negotiations and given a detailed summary of the 
agreement’s main features. Then panelists evaluated a 
series of critiques—some general, some quite 
specific—prominent in the Congressional debate, and 
assessed a rebuttal offered for each.  
 
Panelists then assessed proposals for three alternative 
courses of action that have been proposed, evaluating 
arguments for and against each and also assessing each 
one’s chances of success. Finally panelists were asked 
what they would recommend to their member of 
Congress—to approve the deal, or disapprove of it, 




The survey was conducted August 17-20, 2015 with a 
panel consisting of a representative sample of 702 
adult registered voters (margin of error: 3.7%).  The 
panel was recruited by Nielsen Scarborough from its 
larger probability-based national panel.  Responses 
were weighted by age, income, gender, education, and 
race with benchmarks from the Census’ 2014 Current 
Population Survey of Registered Voters. The sample 
was also weighted by party identification, though the 
effect of this weighting was slight.  
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SUMMARY and KEY FINDINGS  
 
Panelists were presented the two major options—for 
Congress to approve of the deal, or to disapprove of 
it—in terms of how acceptable or tolerable they would 
find it. Six in ten found either option at least tolerable. 
 
Panelists were presented general critiques of the deal 
followed by rebuttals and asked to evaluate each one 
in terms of how convincing it was. Two thirds found 
convincing the argument that the whole idea of 
negotiating with Iran is misguided, while slightly fewer 
found convincing the argument that diplomacy is the 
best available approach. Two thirds found convincing 
the argument that the deal would increase the chances 
that Iran would end up with nuclear weapons, while 
just under six in ten found convincing the argument 
that it reduces the chance. Just over half found 
convincing the argument that the US could have gotten 
a better deal, while slightly more found convincing the 
argument that this was not the case.  
 
Panelists were then presented critiques of specific of 
the deal—that the deal does not provide inspectors 
access anytime and anywhere, that the special limits 
are only in place for 10-15 years, and that the deal 
frees up about $100 billion in assets that the Iranian 
government could use for negative purposes. All of 
these arguments were found convincing by large 
majorities, while the rebuttals were found convincing 
by modest majorities. While large majorities of both 
parties found the critiques convincing, large majorities 
of Democrats found the rebuttals convincing, but only 
about one in three Republicans did. 
 
Panelists were asked to evaluate arguments for and 
against alternatives to the deal. The argument in favor 
of ramping up sanctions to get Iran to give up uranium 
enrichment entirely was found convincing by six in ten, 
while the argument against this proposal was also 
found convincing by the same number. Asked how 
likely it would be that other countries would stop 
trading with Iran in response to sanctions, six in ten 
thought it would be at least somewhat likely.  
 
The argument in favor of Congress telling the 
administration that it should seek to renew 
negotiations to get a deal with better was found  
convincing by six in ten.  However, a larger two-thirds 
(including nearly six in ten Republicans) found 
convincing the counter argument that this is not 
realistic.  Asked how likely it is that the other 
permanent members of the UN Security Council would 
agree to this plan, a majority said that it was not likely. 
Asked how likely it is that Iran would agree to return to 
negotiations and make concessions, eight in ten said it 
was not likely.   
 
The argument for using military threats against Iran to 
give up its nuclear enrichment program and allow 
anytime/anywhere inspections was found unconvincing 
by a modest majority, while the argument against it 
was found convincing by more than seven in ten.  Eight 
in ten thought it was not likely that Iran would 
capitulate in response to such threats.  
 
After considering the various arguments and options, 
panelists reassessed the options separately. Approving 
of the deal was found slightly more acceptable or 
tolerable, and not approving of the deal slightly less so. 
 
Panelists were finally asked whether they would 
recommend that their Members of Congress approve 
of the deal. Those that did not recommend approval 
were offered other options. Ultimately 55% 
recommended approval, including 72% of Democrats, 
61% of Independents and 33% of Republicans. Twenty-
three percent recommended ramping up sanctions, 
14% seeking to renegotiate the deal, and 7% using 









Panelists were briefed about issues surrounding Iran’s 
uranium enrichment program; about how the 
negotiations were conducted; and main features of 
the final agreement. Half said they knew at least some 
about the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while the 
rest knew little. Similar numbers said they knew that 
as part of the NPT Iran had agreed to not develop 
nuclear weapons. 
 
The briefing provided background on the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, covering the following points:  
 
• Under the NPT, Iran can have a nuclear energy 
program, though not a nuclear weapons program. 
• Iran is required as an NPT member to provide 
information to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and accept IAEA inspections, to assure 
that its program is purely peaceful. 
• For nuclear energy purposes, enrichment of uranium 
to the 5% level is adequate; a nuclear weapon usually 
requires a 90% level. 
•  In 2002 the IAEA determined that Iran had been 
building an enrichment facility without informing the 
agency, and had other activities that could be related 
to developing a nuclear weapon. 
• From 2003 to 2006, Iran suspended work towards 
enrichment and cooperated with IAEA as part of an 
international effort to resolve the issue, but no final 
agreement resulted and Iran resumed enrichment. 
• The UN Security Council passed a resolution 
demanding that Iran suspend enrichment-related 
activities and imposing some economic sanctions. 
• The US had stopped virtually all its trade with Iran 
well before it imposed new sanctions. 
• The US’ new sanctions, related to Iran’s nuclear 
program, are aimed at other countries’ business with 
Iran and have indeed reduced such business. Iran, 
nonetheless, persisted in enriching uranium and 
substantially increased its capacity to do so.  
 
The briefing then explained the main components of 
the agreement resulting from the negotiations that 
began in February 2013: 
 
Among other things, Iran has agreed to: 
• Recommit to never build a nuclear weapon. 
 
• Limit its uranium enrichment below the 3.67 percent 
level for 15 years, making the uranium only useful 
for nuclear energy. After 15 years they will be able to 
enrich to a higher level, such as for medical 
purposes, but not to develop a military capability.  
• Deeply reduce its stockpile of low-enriched 
uranium—cutting it by 98 percent—for 15 years.  
Reduce its number of centrifuges (the devices that 
enrich uranium) by two-thirds—keeping only its 
older and slower centrifuge models—for 10 years. 
The other centrifuges will go into storage monitored 
by the IAEA.  
• Allow intrusive inspections of all declared nuclear 
facilities, which will be permanent. 
• Allow inspection of any site, including military bases, 
where inspectors have evidence of suspicious 
activity. Iran could appeal to a council that includes 
all the countries that signed the agreement and seek 
to explain the suspicious activity, whereupon the 
council will decide, by majority rule, whether the  
inspections will proceed. The process of making this 
decision cannot take more than 24 days.  
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In exchange, the UN and the EU will lift their nuclear-
related sanctions on Iran and the US will suspend its 
nuclear-related sanctions, after verification that Iran  
has fulfilled its requirements. If Iran is found to be in 
violation of the agreement the sanctions against Iran 
will ‘snap back’ and be reimposed. If Iran complies fully 
with its obligation for eight years, then Congress will  
consider whether or not the US nuclear-related 
sanctions should be permanently lifted.   
 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS SEPARATELY  
 
Panelists were presented the two major options—for 
Congress to approve of the deal, or to disapprove of 
it—in terms of how acceptable or tolerable they 
would find it. Six in ten found either option at least 
tolerable. 
 
Panelists were presented the two alternative  
policies between which they would ultimately decide—
whether Congress should approve or disapprove of: 
 
…this international agreement that limits Iran’s  
capacity to enrich uranium to the low level 
necessary for nuclear energy, requires it to accept 
intrusive inspections, and lifts sanctions on Iran 
once it deeply reduces its stockpile of enriched 
uranium and its number of operating centrifuges? 
 
Panelists were asked to evaluate each option on a scale 
of 0 to 10, with 0 being completely unacceptable,  
10 being completely acceptable and 5 being ‘just 
tolerable.’  Thus a 0-4 score means the option is 
unacceptable, a 5 means it is tolerable, and a 6-10 
score means it is acceptable.   
 
Both options received very similar assessments.  Sixty-
one percent found approving of the deal to be either  
acceptable (45%) or tolerable (16%).  A similar 59% 
found disapproval acceptable (47%) or tolerable (12%).  
However, more panelists gave this option higher scores 
in the 6-to-10 range, so its mean score was 5.6—higher 
than 5.1 for approving the deal.  About the same  
numbers rated each option not acceptable—39% for 




There were substantial differences by party:  
 
• Among Republicans, 59% thought approving of the 
deal would not be acceptable (24% acceptable, 16% 
tolerable), while disapproving of the deal was 
acceptable to seven in ten (71%).  
• Among Democrats, four in five (79%) thought 
approving of the deal would be acceptable  
(60%) or tolerable (19%), while disapproving of the 
deal was not acceptable to 59%.  
• Among independents, six in ten (63%) thought 
approving of the deal would be acceptable (52%) or 
tolerable (11%). Disapproving of the deal was at least 
tolerable to a modest 52% (acceptable, 39%), but 
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ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL CRITIQUES OF THE DEAL 
Panelists were presented general critiques of the deal 
followed by rebuttals and asked to evaluate each one 
in terms of how convincing it was.  
• Two thirds found convincing the argument that the 
whole idea of negotiating with Iran is misguided, 
while slightly fewer found convincing the argument 
that diplomacy is the best available approach.  
• Two thirds found convincing the argument that the 
deal would increase the chances that Iran would 
end up with nuclear weapons, while just under six 
in ten found convincing the argument that it 
reduces the chance.  
• Just over half found convincing the argument that 
the US could have gotten a better deal, while 
slightly more found convincing the argument that 
this was not the case.  
 
Panelists first considered three broad, general critiques 
frequently voiced since the announcement of the deal.  
 
Whether to negotiate with Iran in general 
The first critique panelists saw declared that for a host 
of reasons Iran was not a fit partner for negotiations in 
the first place, and that… “Making a deal…treats them 
like they are a legitimate country, which they are not.” 
Seven in ten (69%) found the critique convincing (41% 
very), a response strongly driven by Republicans (86%) 
and independents (72%). Democrats were divided, with 
49% finding the critique convincing and 50% not. 
 
CRITIQUE: The whole idea of making a deal with Iran is 
misguided. Iran is fundamentally hostile to the United 
States, with Iranians regularly chanting ‘Death to 
America.’ Iranian leaders also endorse the elimination 
of Israel. They support terrorist groups and seek to 
dominate the Middle East. Iran has shown that it is 
unreliable and dishonest: it has violated arms control 
agreements in the past. We simply can’t trust Iran’s 
government. Making a deal with it treats them like they 









The rebuttal stated that a diplomatic solution requiring 
inspections and verification was better than the 
alternatives of simply tightening sanctions or military 
action, because both of these were likely to fail. The 
rebuttal was found convincing by almost as many—
63%, though fewer found it very convincing (28%). 
However, 52% of Republicans found it unconvincing 
(46% convincing), while four in five Democrats (80%) 
found it convincing (46% very). Independents reflected 
the full sample. 
 
REBUTTAL: Regardless of how we feel about Iran, a 
diplomatic agreement with tight restrictions and tough 
inspections is the best available approach.  We have 
been tightening sanctions for years now and yet Iran 
has not given up enriching uranium. Bombing Iran’s 
nuclear facilities would just lead Iran to kick out the 
IAEA inspectors and rebuild the program underground. 
Invading and occupying is completely unrealistic given 
that Iran is a huge country, with a substantial military, 
and a large population that would likely be very hostile. 
Given that the Iranian government has reached an 
agreement with our negotiators that is based on a 
commitment not to build nuclear weapons, we should 
give this option a chance. Making a deal with them 
does not mean we trust them—it means having 
intrusive inspections to verify that they are respecting 
the limits they agreed to and are not building a nuclear 
weapon. 
 




Whether the agreement raises or lowers the chances 
of Iran getting a nuclear weapon  
The next broad critique concerned whether the 
agreement would increase or reduce the chances that  
Iran will develop a nuclear weapon at some point. It 
argued that since Iran’s centrifuges would be stored 
away but not destroyed, and since some forms of 
research and development could continue, the deal 
would actually increase Iran’s chances for a nuclear 
weapon, leaving it in a good position to break out at a 
later time. Two thirds (68%) called this argument 
convincing (very 38%). Nearly all Republicans thought 
so (84%), as did about three in five Democrats and 
independents (57% and 60% respectively). 
 
CRITIQUE: This deal increases the chance that Iran will 
end up with a nuclear weapon. The deal does not fully 
remove Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons. 
Most of the centrifuges will simply be stored away. 
More important, limiting Iran’s enrichment to the 
3.67% level does not mean that its progress toward a 
nuclear weapon will be completely stopped. They will 
be able to continually refine their know-how on 
enrichment and do other types of research and 
development. After eight and a half years they will also 
be able to produce some more advanced centrifuges. 
Thus, should Iran decide to break out of the 
agreement, it will be able to simply kick out the UN 
inspectors, restart its centrifuges and move toward 






The rebuttal said that the deal’s intrusive inspections, 
98% stockpile reduction and reduction of centrifuges to 
a third of what Iran had before would reduce the 
chances Iran could develop a nuclear weapon. Just 
under six in ten (56%) found this convincing (very, 
25%). While 77% of Democrats found it convincing, this 
was true of only 37% of Republicans (independents, 
53%). 
 
REBUTTAL: This deal reduces the chances that Iran will 
end up with a nuclear weapon. It puts in place a 
permanent intrusive inspection regime so we will know 
exactly what the Iranians are doing, and it blocks all 
their paths to a nuclear weapon. It reduces their 
stockpile of enriched uranium by 98% and their number 
of centrifuges by two-thirds. If Iran sticks with the deal, 
we’ll know they aren’t making a nuclear weapon. If 
they try to break out of the deal, with more intrusive 
inspections, we will have much better means to spot it 
immediately, and it will be so completely clear that we 
will be better able to mobilize the world against them.  
Either way we come out ahead of where we are now. 
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Whether it was possible to negotiate a better deal 
This argument cited the deal’s widely reported positive 
reception from ordinary Iranians as evidence that 
“clearly they feel they got the better of us,” and 
asserted that the US could have extracted better terms 
by walking away. This was convincing to a modest 
majority (54%; very, 23%). While 72% of Republicans 
thought it convincing, three in five Democrats said it 
was not (60%). Independents were divided. 
 
CRITIQUE: Surely, the US could have gotten a better 
deal. When the deal was reported in Tehran, people 
were cheering in the streets. Clearly they feel that they 
got the better of us and were relieved at the possibility 
of the sanctions coming off. They need this deal more 
than we do. If we had simply walked away from the 
table the Iranians would have begged us to come back, 
and they would have been ready to make more 
concessions.  
 
The rebuttal pointed out that the hardliners in Iran are 
not happy with the deal, which suggests political 
leaders there are already making important 
concessions, and so more pressure would not get more 
results. The rebuttal did about as well as the critique, 
with 55% finding it convincing (very, 21%). Three in 
four Democrats (75%) found it convincing, while 59% of 
Republicans found it unconvincing. Independents were 
divided, as they were for the preceding critique as well. 
 
REBUTTAL: It is always an appealing fantasy that with a 
little more pressure one could get a better deal. In 
Tehran, some Iranians are also complaining that Iran 
could have gotten a better deal. Though many average  
 
 
people in Tehran were cheering, the hardliners were 
not happy with the deal and the Supreme Leader 
seems to have come around only begrudgingly. When 
we put more pressure on them in earlier negotiations, 
they did not come back with more concessions, but 
rather, greatly accelerated their nuclear program.  
 
ASSESSMENT OF CRITIQUES OF SPECIFIC TERMS  
OF THE DEAL  
 
Panelists were then presented critiques of specific 
terms of the deal:  
• it does not require Iran to stop all enrichment;  
• it does not provide inspectors access anytime and 
anywhere;  
• the special limits are only in place for 10-15 years;  
• the deal frees up about $100 billion in assets that 
the Iranian government could use for negative 
purposes.  
All of these arguments were found convincing by large 
majorities and the rebuttals were found convincing by 
modest majorities. While large majorities of both 
parties found the critiques convincing, large majorities 
of Democrats found the rebuttals convincing, but only 
about one in three Republicans did. 
  
Whether Iran should have to stop all enrichment 
This critique argued that since Iran’s past actions show 
it cannot be trusted with enrichment, the deal should 
require Iran to completely give up enrichment 
capacity.  Two thirds (68%) found this convincing (40% 
very), including majorities of Republicans (84%), 
Democrats (58%) and independents (65%). 
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CRITIQUE: The deal allows Iran to continue to enrich 
uranium. It should require that Iran give up all of its 
capacity for enrichment. Iran has shown that it cannot 
be trusted with this capability. Letting Iran have the 
capacity to enrich leaves it in a position to break out of 
the deal and race for a nuclear weapon.  
 
The rebuttal said that because NPT recognizes all 
nations’ right to a nuclear energy program, getting Iran 
to commit to limit its enrichment is the only reasonable 
goal; the US “would never let other countries tell us 
whether or not we can make our own nuclear 
fuel.”  Three in five (61%) found this convincing (29% 
very); among Democrats and independents this was 
75% and 61% respectively.  A majority of Republicans 
disagreed (53%; 46% convincing). 
 
REBUTTAL: Getting Iran to commit to limit its 
enrichment is the only reasonable goal. As a Member 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has agreed not to 
have nuclear weapons, but it never agreed not to 
enrich uranium. The Treaty even recognizes all nations’ 
right to a nuclear energy program.  We would never let 
other countries tell us whether or not we can make our 
own nuclear fuel. 
Whether the deal’s inspection provisions 
are strong enough 
One specific critique expressed dissatisfaction with the 
deal’s special procedure for inspections of places in 
Iran that are not on the list of declared nuclear sites, 
saying “We can demand to inspect those sites if we see 
suspicious activities, but Iran can ask for hearings 
where it can argue that it is not really necessary…” and 
that Iran could potentially have as much as 24 days to 
hide activities.  Four in five (79%) found this a 
convincing argument (48% very), and this view was 
widely held among Republicans (89%), Democrats 
(71%), and independents (76%). 
 
CRITIQUE: While the deal does allow us to continuously 
monitor nuclear sites, it does not provide 
anytime/anywhere access to other sites such as 
military installations. We can demand to inspect those 
sites if we see suspicious activities, but Iran can ask for 
hearings where it can argue that it is not really 
necessary. We can ultimately gain access, but the 
whole process can take up to 24 days, and meanwhile 
Iran could hide their illegal activities. While some illegal 
nuclear activities can be detected, others cannot.  
 
The rebuttal did much less well. It pointed out that 
monitoring involves far more than just visiting (ground  
observation of the area, satellite photographs, 
radiation testing), and argued that consequently 
cheating is extremely difficult. A modest 53% found it 
convincing (21% very). Evaluations were very partisan, 
with 71% of Democrats and only 34% of Republicans 
finding the rebuttal convincing (independents were 
divided). 
 
ASSESSING THE IRAN DEAL                            9 
 
 
REBUTTAL: It will be very hard for Iran to cheat without 
being caught. In addition to continuously monitoring 
nuclear sites, we will be able to monitor activities 
throughout the country with resources on the ground 
and by satellite. If we see suspicious activities we can 
demand access anywhere. Even if Iran holds up the 
process a few weeks we will continue to observe the 
site closely during that period. Further, it’s not possible 
to remove all signs of nuclear activities. For example, 
Geiger counters can detect whether any significant 
nuclear materials were in the area at any time in the 
previous several months.  
 
Whether the special limits are too temporary 
Another specific critique held that after 10 or 15 years, 
as different special limits expire, Iran will once again be 
in a position where it could enrich enough uranium for 
a nuclear weapon in a short period of time if it broke 
other parts of the agreement and violated the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. Seven in ten (72%) found this 
convincing (42% very). This included majorities of 
Republicans (87%), Democrats (60%), and 
independents (66%). 
 
CRITIQUE: After 10-15 years most of the special limits 
on Iran’s nuclear activities will go away. Iran will be 
able to increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, 
increase its numbers of centrifuges and enrich above 
the 3.67% limit. Clearly, Iran will then be in a position 
to break out of the agreement and build a nuclear 
weapon quickly. They will just have to bide their time 






The rebuttal argued that intrusive inspections will 
remain after the special limits expire, the world’s 
knowledge of the details of Iran’s nuclear program will 
be vastly greater as a result of the agreement, and that  
if Iran were to move toward non-compliance with the 
NPT, the US’ hands would not be tied in any way. But 
this was convincing to only a bare majority (51%; 20% 
very).  Reactions were extremely partisan, with 71% of 
Democrats but only 30% of Republicans finding it 
convincing. Independents reflected the full sample. 
 
REBUTTAL: It is true that if after 10 years Iran has 
complied with the terms of the agreement, it will be 
able to have the same civilian nuclear programs as 
other members of the NPT Treaty without nuclear 
weapons. However, the intrusive inspections will stay 
in place and Iran will still be committed to not building 
a nuclear weapon. After 15 years of intrusive 
inspections of all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program – 
from its uranium mines through to its centrifuges – we 
will have a good handle on the situation and be able to 
detect unusual activities if Iran were to decide to break 
out of the NPT and pursue a nuclear weapon. We will 
be in a good position – much better than now – to 
intervene in whatever way we see fit. Nothing in the 
agreement would prevent us from taking whatever 
steps we deem necessary to stop Iran from getting a 
nuclear weapon. 
 




Whether releasing frozen assets will be a grave 
security threat 
A third specific critique focused on the release of Iran’s 
frozen assets, arguing that Iran will likely use the funds 
for military and proxy activities, including the support 
of terrorist groups in the Middle East. This critique was 
found convincing on a wide bipartisan basis: 76% 
overall (51% very), including 87% of Republicans, 67% 
of Democrats, and 75% of independents. 
 
CRITIQUE: The deal calls for removing the sanctions on 
Iran, which will make about $100 billion of frozen 
Iranian funds available to the Iranian government. Iran 
will be able to use this money to strengthen its military, 
pursue its destabilizing activities in the Middle East and 
support terrorist groups. That’s why allies in the region 
are worried about this deal. Thus, this deal will hurt our 
friends and help our enemies. It will also strengthen 
Iran’s economy which will help them withstand future 
sanctions if they decide to breakout and go after a 
nuclear weapon.  
 
The rebuttal, again, did much less well. It argued that it 
will be politically necessary for Rouhani to direct most 
of the released money to the country’s ailing economy, 
which is the CIA’s assessment as well. A bare majority 
of 51% found this convincing, with two thirds of  
Democrats (68%) and a majority of independents (55%) 
thinking so, but only 31% of Republicans. 
 
REBUTTAL: Even though some of the funds that are 
unfrozen may be used in support of the kinds of 
activities that make Iran a problem for the US, a recent 
CIA assessment concluded that most of the money 
from frozen assets will be used to shore up Iran’s 
economy. Iran only spends 3% of its GDP on defense, 
so it is unlikely to treat this money differently. 
Furthermore, surveys show that the Iranian public is 
expecting to see some immediate positive economic  
results from the deal, so President Rouhani will 
probably have to try to deliver on that promise.  
 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS  
 
Having evaluated critiques of the deal with their 
rebuttals, panelists then moved on to considering what 
alternative courses of action if Congress were to 
disapprove of the deal. There were three alternatives: 
one based on ramping up sanctions, a second on 
starting a new round of negotiations, and a third on 
military threats and possible action. For each 
alternative, panelists evaluated an argument in favor 
and an argument against.  They were also asked to rate 
how likely it was that the alternative would succeed in 
its objectives. 
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Ramping Up Sanctions  
 
The argument in favor of ramping up sanctions to get 
Iran to give up uranium enrichment entirely was 
found convincing by six in ten, while the argument 
against this proposal was also found convincing by the 
same number. Asked how likely it would be that other 
countries would stop trading with Iran in response to 
sanctions, six in ten thought it would be at least 
somewhat likely.  
 
The first alternative proposed that the US Congress 
should reject the deal and set the goal of getting Iran to 
end all uranium enrichment, doing this via new 
sanctions on Iran and secondary sanctions on other 
countries. Eventually, it argued, the Iranian people 
would demand that the enrichment program be given 
up. Over three in five (63%) found the argument 
convincing (33% very), but a majority of Democrats 
(54%) did not. Four in five Republicans (82%) found it 
convincing. Independents reflected the full sample. 
 
PROPOSAL: The US Congress should reject the current 
deal with Iran and instead insist on getting Iran to give 
up its enrichment program entirely. We should stick 
with sanctions and ratchet them up higher, not just on 
Iran, but also on other countries that are doing 
business with Iran. We can see they are working. The 
Iranian economy is suffering and the Iranian people 
have had enough. That is why they elected a new 
president that was willing to come to the table. 
Eventually, the Iranian people will get tired of the 
economic pain that comes from the sanctions, and this 
will lead them to demand that Iran fully give up its 
enrichment program. We should stick with the 
sanctions until Iran gives up enrichment entirely and  
permanently, and allows inspectors in on our terms.  
 
The critique of this proposal argued that returning to a 
sanctions regime will involve pressuring the very 
countries who have negotiated and signed the deal, 
and thus will not work.  This was found convincing by 
62% (28% very)—about as many as had found the 
proposed alternative convincing—and 70% of 
Democrats. Unusually, Republicans were divided. 
 
Panelists were then asked whether “most countries will 
agree not to do business with Iran.” Interestingly, the  
response was not very partisan. Overall, 59% thought 
this likely and 40% did not. Majorities of Republicans 
(68%), Democrats (55%), and independents (53%) 
thought it likely.  
 
CRITIQUE: Because the US has already stopped its trade 
with Iran, the only way Congress has been able to 
impose new sanctions is by threatening other 
countries, some of them allies, with sanctions unless 
they stop their business relations with Iran. Sometimes, 
we have actually punished their companies with fines. 
Many countries resent this. Cutting off trade with Iran 
hurts other countries’ economies and they do not like 
being pushed around. This harms our relations with 
other countries, including friends and allies. We need 
to face the fact that, whether we like it or not, our 
allies and other Members of the UN Security Council 
have signed the deal with Iran. The idea that the US is 
going to get other countries to go along with its plan 
for Iran by threatening not to do business with them is 
just not going to work.  




Renegotiating the Deal  
 
Six in ten found convincing the argument that 
Congress should tell the administration to renegotiate 
the deal to get better terms.  
• However, a larger two-thirds (including nearly six in 
ten Republicans) found convincing the argument 
that this is not realistic.  
• Asked how likely it is that the other permanent 
members of the UN Security Council would agree to 
this plan, a majority said that it was not likely.  
• Asked how likely it is that Iran would agree to 
return to negotiations and make concessions, eight 
in ten said it was not likely.   
 
The next proposal argued that Congress should reject 
the deal, try to keep sanctions in place, and demand 
that the administration try to renew negotiations with 
greater resolve to extract concessions. This argument 
was found convincing by 59%, but a majority of 
Democrats (58%) said it was unconvincing. Though four 
in five Republicans (80%) found it convincing, 
independents were lower, at 55%, than the full sample. 
 
PROPOSAL: The US Congress should reject the nuclear 
deal with Iran and do whatever it can to keep sanctions 
in place. Congress should tell the administration to try 
to renew negotiations with Iran so as to get better 
terms. Negotiators would then seek to get even tighter 
limits on Iran’s enrichment activities, to extend time 
limits on the terms of the deal, and to ensure that IAEA 
inspectors have true anytime/anywhere inspections. 
Sanctions on Iran would remain in place or tightened 
further until a better deal is reached. With the threat of 
continued or increased sanctions and a greater resolve  
in the negotiations we will be effective in extracting 
more concessions.  
 
The critique of the proposal argued that the US was 
unlikely to drag other world powers—much less Iran— 
back to the negotiating table, and that sanctions would 
fall apart instead and Iran would be less constrained 
eventually. Two thirds (67%) found this rebuttal 
convincing (33% very)—eight points more than for the  
proposal. This was a bipartisan reaction, including 58% 
of Republicans and 76% of Democrats.   
 
CRITIQUE: This proposal is simply unrealistic. It is 
extremely unlikely that the other permanent Members 
of the UN Security Council, especially China and Russia, 
after years of negotiations, would simply abandon the 
existing deal and reopen negotiations with Iran 
because the US changed its mind. It is equally unlikely 
that Iran would agree to reopen negotiations or would 
be willing to show any greater flexibility. Other 
countries that are already gearing up to do business 
with Iran are unlikely to want to reverse course 
because the US changed its mind. Many countries 
would be annoyed with the US. The most likely 
scenario is that the sanctions against Iran would simply 
fall apart, and the US and its allies would be divided. In 
the end, Iran would be less constrained than it is now 
and much less constrained than it would be under the 
deal. 




Panelists were then asked two questions about 
likelihood of success. The first asked how likely it is that 
the P5+1 would agree to abandon the existing deal  
and return to negotiations. A 54% majority thought this 
unlikely, while 44% thought it likely. Majorities of  
Democrats (61%) and independents (53%) thought it 
unlikely, while the prospect divided Republicans. 
 
Panelists were then asked, “How likely do you think it is 
that Iran would agree to return to negotiations and 
would agree to make more concessions?” Four in five 










Using Military Threats  
 
The argument for using military threats against Iran to 
get it to give up its nuclear enrichment program and 
allow anytime/anywhere inspections was found 
unconvincing by a modest majority, while the 
argument against this policy was found convincing by 
more than seven in ten.  Eight in ten thought it was 
unlikely that Iran would capitulate in response to 
military threats.  
 
The final alternative proposal relied on military means, 
arguing that Congress should reject the deal and the US 
should threaten military strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites 
unless Iran agrees to US demands. Refusal would be 
met with escalation. This was found unconvincing by a 
modest majority (52%), but six in ten Republicans did  
find it convincing (59%). It was unconvincing to 64% of 
Democrats and 54% of independents. 
 
PROPOSAL: The US Congress should reject the deal 
with Iran. Rather, the US should use its military power 
as a means of assuring that Iran gives up its enrichment 
program and any possibility of acquiring nuclear 
weapons. First, we should threaten them with military 
strikes against those nuclear sites unless they agree to 
give up their program and allow full inspections on our 
terms for an indefinite period. If they do not agree, we 
should proceed to strike those sites. If they still do not 
agree and start to move their nuclear facilities 
underground, we need to be ready to escalate our 
military attacks further until they relent. Military  
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conflict with Iran would not be a good thing for the US, 
but a nuclear-armed Iran would be worse.  
 
The critique of this proposal called it “extremely 
dangerous” and said it could lead to a situation in  
which the US, without allies, had to invade a vast, well-
populated and determined country in order to achieve 
its objectives. This argument was found convincing by  
seven in ten (72%), including party majorities: two 
thirds of Republicans (67%), four in five Democrats 
(79%), and seven in ten independents (72%).  
 
CRITIQUE: This is an extremely dangerous idea. The 
chances that Iran will capitulate in the face of military  
threats are low. When Iraq attacked and moved into 
Iran with superior military power in 1980, Iran fought 
back hard, suffered millions of casualties and regained 
all its territory. If we attack Iran’s nuclear sites they are 
unlikely to capitulate. They will surely rebuild those 
facilities underground, and most likely with the 
determination to build a nuclear weapon to defend 
themselves. At that point our only options would be to 
accept their building a nuclear weapon, or invade the 
country. Since Iran is more than twice the size of Iraq, 
this would be extraordinarily difficult and costly, and 
chances are that the US would be pretty much by itself 
in this effort. Surely, it makes more sense to first try 









Panelists were then asked how likely they thought it 
was that threats to attack Iran’s nuclear sites would 
lead Iran to give up its enrichment program and allow  
anytime/anywhere inspections. Eight in ten (81%) 
believed success was unlikely, and only a quarter of  
Republicans (26%) thought success likely. Both  
Democrats and independents approached nine in ten 
(86-87%) viewing success as unlikely. 
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RE-ASSESSING THE OPTIONS SEPARATELY  
 
After considering the various arguments and options, 
panelists reassessed the options separately. 
Approving the deal was found slightly more 
acceptable, and not approving the deal slightly less so. 
  
After this deliberation on the Iran deal and the 
alternatives to Congress approving of it, panelists were 
asked how they would feel on a 0-10 scale if Congress 
were to approve or disapprove of the international 
agreement. A number of small but 
statistically significant changes occurred.  
 
Approving of the deal became slightly more 
acceptable. The mean score moved from 5.1 to 5.3 
with those regarding approval as at least tolerable (5 
or higher) rising from 61% to 63%.  Among Republicans, 
the mean score moved from 3.3 to 3.6, with the 
percentage regarding it as at least tolerable rising from 
40% to 44%.  Among independents, the mean scores 
moved up from 5.3 to 5.7, with those finding it 
tolerable going from 63% to 71%.  
 
Asked to reassess Congress disapproving of the deal, 
the mean score moved down, from 5.6 to 5.1, with 
the percentage finding it tolerable dropping from 59% 
to 58% (those saying “acceptable” dropped from 47% 
to 42%).  Republicans’ mean moved down from 7.6 to 
7.0, with those finding it tolerable dropping from 83% 
to 79% and Democrats down from 3.9 to 3.5, with the 
percentage regarding it as at least tolerable dropping 
from 40% to 38%. Among Republicans, fewer found 




Panelists were finally asked whether they would 
recommend that their Members of Congress approve 
of the deal. Those that did not recommend approval 
were offered other options. Ultimately 55% 
recommended approval, including 72% of Democrats, 
61% of Independents and 33% of Republicans. 
Twenty-three percent recommended ramping up  
sanctions, 14% seeking to renegotiate the deal, and 
7% using military threats.  
 
Panelists went through a two-stage process.  They were 
first asked to choose whether to recommend approval  
 
or disapproval of the deal. A modest 52% majority 
initially recommended approval, while 47% 
recommended disapproval. The result was very  
partisan – 69% of Democrats approved and 69% of 
Republicans disapproved. Among independents, three 
in five chose approval (60%).  
 
Those who recommended disapproval were then 
offered the alternative options that they had evaluated 
earlier: ramping up sanctions higher until Iran ends 
enrichment; trying to start a renegotiation; or 
threatening military strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and 
escalating if our demands are not met. They were also 
offered the option of approving the deal.  
 
The most chosen alternative option was increasing 
sanctions (23%), followed by renegotiation (14%) and 
military pressure (7%).  Another 3% decided on 
approval of the deal, and this included 3% of both 
Democrats and Republicans. This raised the total for 
approving the deal to 55%. Thus at the end of the 
process a clear majority concluded that approving of 
the deal would be the best approach and no other 
option received support by more than one in four.  
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